Who are Kissinger’s Clients?

As we have been showing with this book, Kissinger is basically a lobbyist who meddles with governments to the detriment of their people. Genocide is the result of the work he does at the behest of whom? When the 911 Commission was put together, Kissinger was entrusted by the US Government with finding out what really happened. This was until he stepped down in order to hide his client list. Who is in his client list?

What else do you need to know?

The text shows below what happens when Kissinger gets asked direct questions about his very obviously destructive behavior.

Kissinger responds to Constancio Pinto who was tortured and seeks answers about Kissinger’s role in the genocide that occurred in his native East Timor:

KISSINGER: Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia. At the airport as we were leaving, the Indonesians told us that they were going to occupy the Portuguese colony of Timor. To us that did not look like a very significant event because the Indians had occupied the Portuguese colony of Goa ten years earlier and to us it looked like another process of decolonization.

Politician Constancio Pinto

Politician Constancio Pinto

Nobody had the foggiest idea of what would happen afterward, and nobody asked our opinion, and I don't know what we could have said if someone had asked our opinion. It was literally told to us as we were leaving. Now there's been a terrible human tragedy in Timor afterward. The population of East Timor has resisted and I don't know whether the casualty figures are correct. I just don't know, but they're certainly significant and there's no question that it's a huge tragedy. All I'm telling you is what we knew in 1975. This was not a big thing on our radar screen. Nobody has ever heard again of Goa after the Indians occupied it. And to us, Timor, look at a map, it's a little speck of an island in a huge archipelago, half of which was Portuguese. We had no reason to say the Portuguese should stay there. And so when the Indonesians informed us, we neither said yes or no. We were literally at the airport. So that was our connection with it, but I grant the questioner the fact that it's been a great tragedy.

When caught, he plays dumb.

When caught, he plays dumb.

ALLAN NAIRN: Mr. Kissinger, my name is Allan Nairn. I'm a journalist in the United States. I'm one of the Americans who survived the massacre in East Timor on November 12, 1991, a massacre during which Indonesian troops armed with American M-16s gunned down at least 271 Timorese civilians in front of the Santa Cruz Catholic cemetery as they were gathered in the act of peaceful mourning and protest. Now you just said that in your meeting with Suharto on the afternoon of December 6, 1975, you did not discuss Timor, you did not discuss it until you came to the airport. Well, I have here the official State Department transcript of your and President Ford's conversation with General Suharto, the dictator of Indonesia.

Suharto

Suharto

It was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. It has been edited under the Freedom of Information Act so the whole text isn't there. It's clear from the portion of the text that is here, that in fact you did discuss the impending invasion of Timor with Suharto, a fact which was confirmed to me by President Ford himself

ALLAN NAIRN

ALLAN NAIRN

in an interview I had with him. President Ford told me that in fact you discussed the impending invasion of Timor with Suharto and that you gave the US...

The patterns show lobbyists manifesting scenarios where regular people are given incentives to kill each other.

The patterns show lobbyists manifesting scenarios where regular people are given incentives to kill each other.

KISSINGER: Who? I or he?

NAIRN: That you and President Ford together gave US approval for the invasion of East Timor. There is another internal State Department memo which is printed in an extensive excerpt here which I'll give to anyone in your audience that's interested. This is a memo of a December 18, 1975, meeting held at the State Department. This was held right after your return from that trip and you were berating your staff for having put on paper a finding by the State Department legal adviser Mr. Leigh that the Indonesian invasion was illegal, that it not only violated international law, it violated a treaty with the US because US weapons were used and it's clear from this transcript-which I invite anyone in the audience to peruse-that you were angry at them first because you feared this memo would leak, and second because you were supporting the Indonesan invasion of East Timor, and you did not want it known that you were doing this contrary to the advice of your own people in the State Department. If one looks at the public actions, sixteen hours after you left that meeting with Suharto the Indonesian troops began parachuting over Dili, the capital of East Timor. They came ashore and began the massacres that culminated in a third of the Timorese population. You announced an immediate doubling of US military aid to Indonesia at the time, and in the mean- time at the United Nations, the instruc- tion given to Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan, as he wrote in his memoirs, was to, as he put it, see to it that the UN be highly ineffective in any actions it might undertake on East Timor... [shouts from the audience]

KISSINGER: Look, I think we all got the point now...

NAIRN: My question, Mr. Kissinger, my question, Dr. Kissinger, is twofold. First, will you give a waiver under the Privacy Act to support full declassification of this memo so we can see exactly what you and President Ford said to Suharto? Secondly, would you support the convening of an international war crimes tribunal under UN supervision on the subject of East Timor and would you agree to abide by its verdict in regard to your own conduct?

Tactics on display:Admit nothingAttack the questioner Attack the evidence

Tactics on display:

Admit nothing

Attack the questioner

Attack the evidence

KISSINGER: I mean, uh, really, this sort of comment is one of the reasons why the conduct of foreign policy is becoming nearly impossible under these conditions. Here is a fellow who's got one obsession, he's got one problem, he collects a bunch of documents, you don't know what is in these documents...

When caught, he plays the victim.

When caught, he plays the victim.